Archive

Archive for the ‘Limits’ Category

Equity Capital

July 31st, 2009

There is a lot of discussion on the net, good and very accurate discussion, about the reserve requirements, and the current almost absence of same. The Eric deCarbonnel post (hat tip Andre. G. and Mickanomics) has a nice summary of the situation in the US. There is one unfortunate problem though with these discussions -  fractional reserve requirements no longer have anything to do with controlling how much money a bank can lend.

What has replaced it, is the regulatory capital requirement. Regulatory or equity capital is a completely separate pile of money that the owners of the bank are required to provide when a bank is started, and maintain at a minimum ratio to their loan book, as the bank is run. The FDIC requires that this be at least $2 million when a bank is founded, plus the anticipated startup costs.  The Basel treaties then specify what percentage or leverage ratio the Bank is allowed to maintain between its equity capital and its loan book, and also what kind of financial instruments the Bank can hold the equity capital in.

There are two things then that control the immediate size of the loan book, of any bank in a Basel treaty conforming country. The amount of money it has on deposit (including savings accounts, and term deposits), and the size of its equity or regulatory capital. The fractional reserve requirement, i.e. the difference between the total amount of money it has on deposit, and the total money it has lent out, is relevant only insomuch as it is not allowed to lend out more money than it has on deposit. Just to ensure that complete confusion reigns, the recommended maximum total capital ratio, ie. the leverage ratio of equity capital to amount being loaned, is 10%. The same as the textbook fractional reserve requirement.

This is the 21st century. Weren’t we supposed to have moon bases by now?

It makes some sense, if you only think about the situation at the individual banks. If a bank makes a loan that doesn’t get paid back, and the loan loss can’t be covered out of profits, then equity capital is there, to in theory, prevent the depositors losing the money in their accounts. This is what is being referred to when there is talk about ‘recapitalizing’ the banks. Obviously too, given that this is all that stands between the depositors, national deposit insurance funds, and significant losses in the case of loan defaults, it’s critical that the equity capital be held in extremely safe forms of financial instruments.  This is why so much of the discussion and rules around equity capital are framed by the risk of default represented by the underlying securities, and the desirability of keeping that as low as possible. Solutions to the current crisis that involve increasing the equity capital are also being floated.

You can see the mental process path that’s being followed here. If banks take a hit to their equity capital, it reduces their loan capacity. If they take a hit that’s bigger than 10%, they have no equity capital left, and then their depositor’s money is endangered. Do everything possible to prevent that happening, the depositor’s money is now safe, and banking can go back to being boring again.

Unfortunately, system design doesn’t work well, when only the individual entities are considered, and not the interactions between them. Concentrating on the risk of individual bank losses, ignores the larger issues being created by a system whose core set of rules, embodies a relationship and an interdependence between loans and the money supply. Especially, if owing to “financial innovation”, some loan instruments are being allowed to masquerade as money.

The simple answer then, to the question  – what is the limit on commercial bank lending? -  is that for any given Bank, it is the  lesser of the total of their deposits (minus a very small fractional reserve requirement that applies only to Net Transaction accounts), or ten times their equity capital. It follows then, that the instantaneous limit for all the Banks, is simply the sum of their deposits, or equity capital allowance.

But that’s merely the instantaneous limit. It tells us  nothing about the way that the system will evolve over time, as loans are made, money is created, loans are repaid and money is destroyed, within the commercial banking sector. Especially within a larger system, that allows debt to be turned into financial instruments, and those instruments to be used as part of the bank’s equity capital.

Or to put it another way, what controls the total amount of equity capital in the system? The old reserve requirement, and its associated commitment to deposit a part of that reserve with the Central Bank, provided the central bank with direct control over the money and loan supplies.  What is the equivalent control over the total quantity of equity capital in the system, since it now effectively regulates the money supply? The quick answer, which will be explored in considerably more detail in the next post, is that there isn’t one.

The regulators were concentrating on local risk at the banks. They appear to have overlooked the systemic risks associated with removing control over the money supply.

The hardest problems to correctly diagnose in distributed systems almost invariably involve two or more concurrent bugs interfering with each other. In the banking system at the moment, we have the Asset Backed Security bug, allowing banks to create an arbitrary quantities of loans; and the Equity Capital snafu, which has essentially introduced a slow leak into the money supply. Next post, i’ll run through a detailed example of how they interwork with each other.

© cc

cc Credit Crises, Fractional Reserve System, Limits

The rise, and rise, of Commercial Bank Lending.

July 11th, 2009

What is the limit on the amount the Commercial Banks are allowed to lend?

The story of credit crises is usually told from the demand side. The irrational exuberance of speculators down the ages drives inflated prices for over priced assets.  Inevitably the bubble bursts. Inevitably everybody pays the price. But the supply side of this formula always seems to get overlooked.  Why are the commercial banks able to supply a seemingly  limitless quantity of  loans to fuel the credit bubble? Why does a speculative bubble in Beanie Baby’s merely cause general embarrassment, while one in real estate cause massive economic dislocation?

This is a deceptively simple question, in the context of the larger fractional reserve banking system, since it is not just the quantity of the  loans that is potentially problematic. Through the fractional reserve process, commercial bank lending also has potential money supply implications. If there is no limit on the total quantity of commercial bank loans, then there is effectively no limit on the commercial banks’ ability to create money through the fractional reserve re-deposit process.

It is also notable that discussion of the problem of credit supply last year, concentrated on the supposed fear that the banks have of the risk in lending to each other in the inter-bank markets, rather than the possibility that they might simply not have had any money to lend.

Hypothetically then, the question can be framed in at least three ways. Either there is a limit on bank lending, in which case it might be reasonable to suppose that it is that limit that is preventing inter-bank lending, and not a sudden outbreak of pathological loan aversion in bankers; or there isn’t, in which case the money supply is being controlled by the commercial bank’s individual lending policies  rather than the central banks, which would be contrary to every foundational Economics textbook.  The third possibility  is that there is supposed to be a limit on lending, but some elements of the financial industry have found a way around it. However, given the entanglement that fractional reserve lending creates between the money and loan supplies, how exactly could this even be detected?

Going back to the previous post, a side effect of the fractional reserve banking system is that it creates two different kinds of debt within the economy. One is straightforward transfers in exchange for IOU’s of various kinds, either between individuals, businesses primarily in the form of bonds, and the government (treasuries). The other are the loans from the commercial banks, which represent a deposit somewhere in the banking system. For want of any better ideas, I’m going to channel physic’s particle/anti-particle structure and call them anti-deposits.  Commercial bank originated loans for long. Debt that results from a direct transfer of monetary tokens will be referred to as transfer debt.

If there is something going wrong uniquely within the fractional reserve banking system, then one expected outcome might be a change in the proportion of anti-deposits  to transfer loans within the general economy. If the amount of outstanding commercial bank loans is increasing faster than the quantity of transfer loans for example. Conversely, if the actual cause of the systemic problems that we’re currently living through is in fact government transfer debt, or increases in “fiat money” as I was confidently told by an Austrian economist back a few months, then we would also see a change, but it would be an increase in the amount of government originated transfer debt relative to commercial bank originated anti-deposits.

The quantity of outstanding debt within the United States economy is reported on a sector basis in the Z1 Flow of Funds report, Table D.3 The chart below shows the per sector information on Debt Outstanding.

Outstanding US Debt by Sector: 1975 - 2008From the explanatory notes in the current report. Foreign debt represents amounts borrowed by foreign financial and non-financial entitities in U.S markets only. Domestic financial sectors consist of government-sponsored enterprises, agency and GSE backed mortgage pools and private financial institutions.

The sectors aren’t totally clean with respect to being able to divide into transfer versus anti-deposit (bank originated debt). The domestic financial sector debt is for the most part being derived from bank loans in the forms of mortgages, since it includes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who buy mortgages from U.S. banks and repackage them as bonds. Presumably also student loans, under the guise of Ginnie Mae.

Even so, it’s noticeable  from the chart above that bank originated debt is growing faster than other sources. Comparing proportionately the amounts owed by each sector in 1975 versus 2008, shows this quite clearly:

US outstanding debt by sector: 1975 vs 2008Proportionally, the last 30 years have seen a shift away from government debt towards commercial bank debt, primarily in the form of mortgages, since that is the main component of the Domestic Financial Sectors sector. They have also seen an extraordinary rise in the total amount of debt, as was shown in the original flow of funds chart, and it also appears that this new debt has predominantly originated from the commercial banks, chiefly in the form of mortgages.

In theory, the fractional reserve mechanisms don’t allow banks to issue arbitrary amounts of debt.  Originally they were  limited to a fraction of their deposits, now they are limited to a multiple of their equity capital. So what exactly has gone wrong that is allowing the commercial banks both to create so many loans, and to increase the money supply?

© cc

cc Credit Crises, Fractional Reserve System, Limits, Prologue

(Job) Security through Obscurity.

May 6th, 2009

One of the many excuses that computer scientists occasionally proffer in order to justify the, well let’s be polite about this, totally appalling standards of documentation in our profession, is that systems are more secure if nobody knows how they work. Seriously.

Regrettably, all of the available empirical evidence suggests that poorly documented systems are in fact wide open to any evil cracker with spare time on their hands, whilst their legitimate users waste considerable amounts of time struggling to figure them out.

Fortunately, at least for the purposes of a quick exchange of fire in a greenhouse, compared to the financial system, the average badly documented computer system looks like it was written up by Shakespeare.

Which means that the biggest challenge in writing a paper describing possible systemic problems in the fractional reserve banking system, is actually trying to determine how that system is implemented and run in the first place.

For example. Go to the Bank of England’s web site, or the Federal Reserve Bank of America, or the European Central Bank, and do a search for “Fractional Reserve Banking”. Since it’s really the central bank’s sole purpose to regulate the FRB system, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to expect some kind of description of what they think they’re regulating. As of writing, in early May 2009, there is nothing.

Of course, an explanation of fractional reserve banking can be found in most economics textbooks. Usually though, that’s just a brief explanation of the reserve function of the central bank, and an explanation of the re-deposit process. I’ve yet to find anything that completely covers in detail what accounts are covered by reserve requirements and what aren’t, the limits the process places on loans, the financial instruments that can be used to hold reserves,  how increases and decreases in reserves are managed, and the effects of changes of some of these factors over time. There are minor but significant differences between countries which also need to be included.  Some attempt to relate the theory to actual macro-economic data would also be useful, if only for the sheer entertainment value.

There are regrettable consequences to this oversight. Currently the third hit for a Google search for Fractional Reserve Banking is a  1995 diatribe by Murray Rothbard which has very fundamental errors in it. In fact, the Net is currently swamped with plausible but demonstrably incorrect explanations of how the reserve banking system works, and enables <insert conspiracy theory of your choice here>. This all presents a fairly sizable barrier to anybody attempting to either understand the system, or even have a rational discussion about it.

Indeed, the best way to see this playing itself out, is to  take a look at the discussion page for the top hit, the Wikipedia entry on Fractional Reserve Banking. This must set a record for Wikipedia discussion pages,both for length, and general confusion..

This is the system of entities, rules, and regulations that control the total quantity of money and loans currently being supplied to the entire world’s economy.

Nothing important then.

© cc

cc Credit Crises, Fractional Reserve System, Limits, Prologue

Exploits

May 3rd, 2009

An exploit, laut Wikipedia, is “a sequence of commands that take advantage of a bug, glitch or vulnerability in order to cause unanticipated behavior.” One of the many things that makes designing distributed systems such a challenge is trying to avoid creating such vulnerabilities. It can be a complete nightmare trying to fix any that make it into a live system, especially if they’re the sleeper kind that only get uncovered after years of successful operation.

The Fractional Reserve Banking System, is a distributed system. It has a set of rather poorly documented rules that are implemented by banks worldwide, which have emerged for the most part from empirical experience. So is this the bug that caused the credit crisis?

Consider two banks:

Bank Deposits Loans Reserve
A 1000 900 100
B 1000 0 0

Bank A has $1000 in deposits, has lent out $900 and has kept a reserve of $100 as it is required to. To be very specific , since it matters more than might be imagined: Bank A is an American bank, and the $1000 is being kept in daily checking accounts, so there is a reserve requirement. To make the example as simple as possible, Bank B just has deposits, and no loans. Bank A creates a Mortgage Backed Security of $900, and sells it to the deposit holder at Bank B.

Bank Deposits Loans Reserve
A 1000
B 100 0 0
MBS: $900

So far so good. Bank A lends out $900 again. It is allowed to do this, this in some sense is what being a bank is all about. The $100 it keeps as a reserve, is a contingency fund to cover any daily demand for funds. The $900 borrowed is then used to purchase something, and eventually is deposited at bank B. This gives the following:

Bank Deposits Loans Reserve
A 1000 900 100
B 1000 0 0
MBS: $900

Notice that the third table is identical to the first, with respect to the money, loans and reserves at each bank. The only difference is the $900 mortgage backed security, representing the $900 in loans that were sold by bank A. Bank A in other words, can go through this loop as many times as it wants, as long as it can find people to lend to, and people to buy the resulting securitised loans.

I haven’t yet found much in Economics about what limits there should be on commercial bank lending. The fractional reserve banking system itself, if it were working as described in textbooks, would impose an implicit limit on the amount, but even this doesn’t appear to be directly acknowledged. The other problem, is that loans are made for many years. So any failure in their systemic regulation, wouldn’t necessarily be noticeable for quite a long time. By the time it was noticed, it might even be thought to be the normal behaviour of the system.

Which does indeed appear to be what’s happening now.

© cc

cc Credit Crises, Lending, Limits, Prologue